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Foreword 
Northern Kosovo is one of the few unresolved flashpoints remaining in Europe. A 
toxic remnant of the wars which ravaged the Balkans in the 90s, the frozen conflict between 
Kosovo Serbs and Albanians is seemingly no closer to resolution despite a decade of 
expensive international intervention. In turn, the irresolution of northern Kosovo prevents 
productive bi-lateral relations between Serbia and Kosovo as well as hindering wider 
development in the region. 
 
This paper, which is a shortened version of David’s Master’s thesis, is an important 
contribution to the policy debate surrounding Northern Kosovo. Based upon a mixture of field 
research and scholarly learning, the analysis convincingly thinks through the two conceivable 
scenarios which may provide for a comprehensive solution to the problem: integration or 
partition. At its core is a carefully constructed analytical perspective which sets the problem in 
a clear conceptual framework, then assesses the expected gains and risks for each scenario. 
Most admirably, the paper then sets out to cost these risks based upon assessment of what it 
may take to mitigate the risk. The impressive result is a forward thinking perspective on the 
issue grounded in a wealth of detail and insight. 
 
This paper will help move the debate on Northern Kosovo forward and represents 
important reading for practitioners involved in the region, but also for scholars and 
practitioners around the world who could use this approach to work out policy choices in 
other, seemingly intractable, situations. 
 
Prof. Dr. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Despite facing many challenges, in general life for citizens of Kosovo shows some sign of 
normalisation. However the northern region of Kosovo, dominated by the divided city of 
Mitrovica, remains in a state of crisis, consumed by deep inter-ethnic tensions and serious 
economic problems. There are two conceivable options which could provide for a 
comprehensive solution to Northern Kosovo. 
 
1. Partition Kosovo along the River Ibar.  
2. Integrate the northern region into Kosovo. 
 
This paper will extensively think through what may happen in each of the above scenarios 
with an analytical framework based upon the following questions: To what extent will these 
options provide for a comprehensive solution to the central problems faced in Northern 
Kosovo? What are the likely future risks in each scenario? How can these risks be mitigated? 
How much would it cost to mitigate these risks?  
 
The results of the analysis are as follows:  
 
 
Three recommendations flow from this analysis: 
 
Recommendation 1:  Pristina, Belgrade and the EU should seek an immediate 
comprehensive solution to the situation in Northern Kosovo and in doing so should reject 
outright any proposal to partition northern Kosovo. 
Recommendation 2: The EU should pursue integration of the northern region into Kosovo 
based upon the Ahtisaari formula and in order to fully mitigate risks should implement four 
risk mitigation policies 
Recommendation 3: The EU should use all available diplomatic means within Serbia’s EU 
accession negotiations to gain Serbia’s support for the integration of Northern Kosovo.  
 
Option Goal Analysis Risk Analysis 
 
 
Functionin
g state 
Economic 
development 
Risk identification and 
assessment 
Risk Mitigation Policy and Cost (€) 
Partitio
n 
HIGH LOW 1.Albanian relocation 
 
2. Regional instability 
 
3. Albanian flight out 
Total: 72 m (322m) 
 
Relocation of Albanians: 60m 
Welfare perspective in south: 12m 
 
(EULEX: 42m  
KFOR:  208m)  
Integrat
ion 
HIGH HIGH 1 Serbian flight out of north 
Mitrovica 
 
2. “Spoilers” attempt to 
destroy agreement 
 
3. Political polarization 
 
Total: 156 m (406m) 
 
Trepca reactivation: 100m 
Hospital renovation: 10m 
University renovation: 40m 
EU Administration: 6m 
 
(EULEX:  42m  
KFOR:    208m)  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, the estimated two million citizens of Kosovo still face many challenges, 
especially the high rates of unemployment { CITATION Zau09 \l 2057 }.Yet, there are clear 
signs that life in Kosovo is normalising.1 In general, Kosovo is politically stable and there is 
greater co-operation between the government in Pristina and Serbs living in enclaves scattered 
around the south of the country, who had previously been instructed by Belgrade to shun any 
form of engagement with Albanians{ CITATION Jud10 \t  \l 2057  }. Now, some Serbs in the 
south of the country are voting in elections organised by Pristina as well as agreeing to use 
services provided by the Kosovan state { CITATION ICG091 \l 2057 }.  
However the northern region of Kosovo, dominated by the divided city of Mitrovica, 
remains in a state of crisis, consumed by deep inter-ethnic tensions and severe economic 
problems.2 This current distress is a far cry from how Mitrovica once was. Up until the 90s, 
Mitrovica was a multiethnic one-company town built around the Trepca mining and 
metallurgy complex. Generally, there was peaceful co-existence and tolerance, with some 
degree of ethnic interaction. Mitrovica had a multiethnic football team- once making it into 
Yugoslavia’s first league- and also a thriving music scene{ CITATION Eur04 \l 2057 }.  
In 1999, war tore the city apart: Serbian security forces accelerated the ethnic 
cleansing of Albanians in the town, burning houses and expelling Albanian residents. Then, 
NATO bombing against Serb positions prompted a flight of the Serbian population to territory 
north of the Ibar. To prevent further bloodshed, French KFOR troops then cordoned off the 
bridge over the river and the divided city of Mitrovica was born { CITATION ICG02 \l 2057 
}.  
Since then, this divide has hardened due to tit for tat violence. In 2001, for example, 
Albanian youths rioted against French KFOR troops after shooting and grenade attacks by 
Serbs in the north of the city culminated in the killing of a fifteen year old boy. The division 
reached its nadir in March 2004 when three Albanian children drowned in the Ibar and, after 
television news gave the impression of Serb blame, there was a riot the next day around the 
main bridge in which four Albanians were killed and hundreds wounded. In response, 
                                                 
1
 Background to Kosovo: After the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remained as part of Serbia until conflict 
broke out in 1998, and was followed in May 1999 by seventy-eight days of NATO bombing. Subsequently, 
Serbian security forces pulled out and Serbia's administration of Kosovo was replaced, at first by a UN 
Transitional Administration (UNMIK) and eventually by Kosovo's own elected bodies in which the remaining 
minority population of Serbs sometimes participated, but generally did not. After declaring independence in 
2008, Kosovo has been recognized by sixty-five countries but not its northern neighbour Serbia, whose refusal to 
grant recognition is supported by Russia, China and many other countries{ CITATION Jud10 \t  \l 2057  } 
2
 Northern Kosovo encompasses the southern outskirts of the city of Mitrovica and which stretches east to the 
border with Montenegro and north and west to the border with Serbia. In total the area has a population of 
around 160,000 people: an estimated 80,000 Albanians live in south Mitrovica, and 40,000 Serbs living in north 
Mitrovica, with a further 40,000 Serbs living in the municipalities of Zvecan and Leposavic. { CITATION Eur04 
\l 2057 } As the most populous and economically important part of this area, nearly all the major developments 
in the northern region focus on the town of Mitrovica. As such I refer to the situation in northern Kosovo as the 
“Mitrovica problem.” The boundaries of North and South Mitrovica are marked by the river Ibar which flows 
through the centre of the town. During this paper the term north Kosovo, northern Kosovo and north Mitrovica 
in reference to the land north of the Ibar River; south Mitrovica refers to the land south of it. Unless otherwise 
stated Serbs, northern Serbs, K Serbs will be used in reference to Serbs living north of the Ibar. Albanian and 
Kosovo Albanian will be used in reference to Albanians living in south Mitrovica.   
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Albanian mobs torched the home of the few remaining Serbs living in south Mitrovica{ 
CITATION ICG05 \l 2057 }.  
 
Today, northern Kosovo is still divided with the Ibar River marking the point at which 
the authority of the newly independent Kosovo ends and the Serb resistance begins. Few 
places in Europe have suffered from the same combined scourges of economic collapse, inter-
communal violence and political contestation. This crisis in turn threatens the development 
potential of the rest of Kosovo and provides a thorn in the side of wider Balkan stability. 
 
What to do with a situation like Northern Kosovo? The current approach pursued by 
the main international actors, notably the EU, can be described as one of containment; a 
policy which aims to provide enough political and financial input to prevent renewed ethnic 
conflict, rather than to aim for a comprehensive solution to the problem.3 
 
Yet, not pursuing a comprehensive solution is counterproductive: it merely 
compounds the economic deterioration and institutional vacuum within the town, which in 
turn fuels persistent insecurity- economic and physical- amongst residents. The current 
approach therefore presides over a regressive dynamic which serves to foster a time bomb of 
mutual resentment and nationalist discontent, which is frequently expressed through low level 
violence, ranging from street scuffles and rock throwing to fire and bomb attacks. 4  
 
This is not just a problem for the citizens directly affected, but the failure to pursue a 
comprehensive solution is the largest obstacle to Serbia and Kosovo having productive bi-
lateral relations and making advances in their now stalled EU ambitions. A major policy shift 
aimed towards a comprehensive solution for northern Kosovo is also in the interests of wider 
regional stability, and the EU and other international actors, who can no longer afford to pour 
resources into an area without tangible signs of progress.5 
 
Serbia, Kosovo and the EU can pursue two conceivable options for a comprehensive 
solution: a partition of Northern Kosovo into Serbia or a final integration of the territory into 
Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari plan. This paper will be an attempt to extensively think 
through what may happen in each of these two possible scenarios. In doing so it will address 
the following questions: To what extent will these options provide for a comprehensive 
solution to the central problems faced in Northern Kosovo? What are the likely future risks in 
each scenario? How can these risks be mitigated? How much would it cost to mitigate these 
risks? As a first step, the next section will outline in more detail how these questions will be 
answered within a coherent analytical framework.  
 
                                                 
3
 The current EU involvement in Mitrovica, aside from the presence of NATO troops and EULEX police, 
involves small scale micro finance projects, small short term employment projects such as environmental 
cleaning, or small businesses projects, such as building a small Rakia factory{ CITATION Off09 \n  \l 2057  }. b  
4
 For a selection of some of the incidents in the last few months see: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-
article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=09&dd=03&nav_id=61530 ; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8221226.stm 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=28&nav_id=64070 
http://balkan-spezial.blogspot.com/2010/01/kosovo-northern-volatility.html  
5
 Even though some member states do not formally recognise Kosovo, the EU has already invested over €2 
billion into Kosovo and now has significant institutional presence on the ground. Most visible is the rule of law 
mission, EULEX, which is composed of around 2,500 staff and was established in 2008. In addition, the EU 
preside over the International Civilian Office (ICO), which has around 200 staff, and whose main role is to act as 
a “political big brother” of the Kosovan government to make sure they implement the provisions of the Ahtisaari 
plan. Though NATO and the OSCE still retain significant missions in Kosovo, it is the EU who is the prime 
international policy actor. 
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Part one: Analytical framework 
There are two realistic options for a comprehensive solution in northern Kosovo. 
• Partition Kosovo along the River Ibar. (Partition scenario) 
• Integrate the northern region into Kosovo based on the formula set out in the 
Ahtisaari plan.  (Integration scenario) 
 
How do we define and test for a “comprehensive solution”? 
What do we mean by a comprehensive solution to Northern Kosovo? A “solution” to 
northern Kosovo could of course be attempted by diplomats in the hallways of New York or 
Brussels using notions of political acceptability as the key criteria by which to judge a “good” 
policy option. Such narrow criteria may provide for a “solution”, but is hardly conducive for a 
lasting solution as it wouldn’t be rooted in a detailed assessment of the needs of the 
population. Hence, this paper will analyse the degree to which either of these scenarios will 
create a comprehensive solution; something which is sustainable in reality. The assessment of 
a comprehensive solution invites therefore much more analytical emphasis to be put on 
overcoming the deeply rooted socio-economic problems on the ground in Northern Kosovo.  
 
What are these deeply rooted problems any comprehensive solution must overcome? 
Northern Kosovo represents a highly complex problem and exhibits many perilous conditions: 
interethnic tensions, a poor health environment, poverty, social instability and inadequate post 
conflict reconstruction. Indeed, one analyst pointedly states: “Mitrovica is a dying town”{ 
CITATION Eur04 \l 2057 }. What then is Mitrovica dying from?6 My argument here is that 
Mitrovica is dying from the interrelated problems of dysfunctional governance and severe 
economic underdevelopment. As such, any comprehensive solution to northern Kosovo must 
be tested according to the extent to which they would address these two root causes of the 
“Mitrovica problem”. 
 
Problem one:  dysfunctional governance 
 
There is no proper functioning system of governance in the territory north of the Ibar.7 
This is the root cause of many of the problems in Mitrovica. For example, dysfunctional 
governance means instability and a shaky system of property and administrative rights which 
strongly disincentives investment and entrepreneurship. This partly explains why economic 
opportunities are virtually nonexistent, the city’s manufacturing base has all but disappeared 
and without extensive public financing, the economy in Mitrovica would collapse. Another 
negative outcome of dysfunctional governance is the undersupply of basic public goods. No 
                                                 
6
 There is little clear conceptual understanding of the root of the problem presented either by practitioners or 
academics. Mitrovica has been variously called as “complex”{ CITATION Eur04 \l 2057 }; “Kosovo’s 
albatross”{ CITATION ICG05 \l 2057 }; “the Northern problem”{ CITATION KIP08 \l 2057 }; or, most often 
(and superficially), the problem is framed in terms of an “ethnically divided city.”{ CITATION Eur08 \l 2057 }. 
7
 The area can therefore be termed an area of limited statehood, meaning that the no state “has the capacity to 
implement and enforce central decisions or even lack the monopoly over the means of violence.”{ CITATION 
Leh06 \l 2057 } A strong indicator of the extent of limited statehood is the widespread presence of organised 
crime which tends thrives in these areas of limited statehood. One local think tank affirms that northern Kosovo 
is “a smuggler’s paradise and a haven for criminals.” Indeed, the fact that the price for fuel in Northern 
Mitrovica is a third below prices in the rest of Kosovo, testifies to the activities of smugglers and the absence of 
the rule of law{ CITATION IKS08 \l 2057 }. 
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“state” has a monopoly of violence in north Mitrovica; so called “Bridge watchers”; Serbian 
police and a few brave Kosovan police compete to provide security in the north with the end 
result that the lack of security is considered to be the biggest problem for Serbian citizens{ 
CITATION UND09 \l 2057 }. Furthermore, citizens do not know who to approach with issues 
or concerns, nor do they know who to hold accountable, while 21% of residents cannot name 
who is really in charge of municipal governance{ CITATION IKS09 \l 2057 }. Without 
governance, serious health issues cannot be addressed and it is also very difficult to encourage 
ethnic co-operation if there is no one legitimate authority to mediate between the two groups.  
 
Having isolated this problem, one must ask the more pertinent question: what is 
causing such dysfunctional governance? There are many explanations for why around two 
thirds of the globe have limited statehood, such as under development, technical or financial 
deficiencies or even as a result of a strategic decision made by elites (Zuercher 2005). But in 
Mitrovica none of these are relevant and the most convincing way of understanding why there 
is no properly functioning state is because statehood is fundamentally contested. In other 
words, to use what scholars Linz and Stepan’s explain as one of the root causes of limited 
statehood, there are “profound differences about what should constitute the polity and which 
demos or demoi shall be members of the political community”{ CITATION Lin96 \p 16 \l 
2057  }.  
 
Hence, the root of the problem lies with these profound differences over what should 
constitute the state. On the one side, the Albanians in Mitrovica affirm the entire north as 
politically within the newly independent borders of Kosovo. On the other, the northern Serbs 
are fully oriented towards Belgrade and assert that the polity is constituted by the Serbian 
political system. To achieve this end, Kosovan Serbs have banned the Kosovan state north of 
the Ibar and have boycotted every election organised by Pristina. Most recently, there were 
demonstrations at the opening of a Kosovo civil services office in the Bosniak Mahalla on 2 
July 2010, and a hand grenade was thrown, killing one person and injuring eleven { 
CITATION ICG10 \l 2057 }.  
 
Furthermore, Kosovo’s Serbs have established parallel political structures in defiance 
of both the UNSC 1244 and Kosovan law. These are funded by the Serbian government who 
pressures Kosovo Serbs to use and staff the parallel institutions rather than anything 
sponsored by Pristina. The Serbian-backed structures include Serbian police in northern 
Kosovo, separate Serb-run courts, and health-care and educational facilities funded directly by 
the Serbian state, though very few of these operate properly { CITATION OSC07 \l 2057 }.8  
The dispute over the state remains unyielding: “no surrender” hardliners are still firmly in 
political control of north Mitrovica, including the uncompromising Democratic Party of 
Serbia (DSS) - the former party of Slobodan Milosevic { CITATION ICG09 \l 2057 } 
 
Problem two: severe economic underdevelopment 
 
The “Mitrovica problem” is not just political but has an important, interrelated 
economic dimension. The local economy is moribund: the World Bank, for example, has 
concluded that Mitrovica has the highest unemployment rates and lowest employment rates 
nationally{ CITATION Wor07 \l 2057 }.9 The number of people receiving social welfare 
                                                 
8
 Even, the UN Secretary-General’s June 2009 report on Kosovo is at pains to admit: “The municipalities in the 
north of Kosovo, as well as northern Mitrovice / Mitrovica continue to operate largely separately from the rest of 
Kosovo.” 
9
 In the south, according to municipal figures, 37 vacancies have emerged since the beginning of 2009, while 
23,756 people have registered as job seekers. 
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benefits from the state in south Mitrovica is nearly as high as the number of people employed. 
In the north, social transfers and work in the grey economy comprised a 60 percent of 
citizens’ total income in 2008{ CITATION SPA08 \l 2057 }. For example, in Mitrovica there 
are huge deficiencies in physical capital, manifested by the very poor infrastructure. A post-
war UNMIK study found that most enterprises are on a “survival level” with 30.8% of micro 
enterprises operating outdoors, 38.5% have no electricity and 46.2% have no water supply{ 
CITATION Eur04 \l 2057 }.Over the course of the decade, little has changed and most 
businesses do not have access to financial or physical capital and property rights remain shaky 
{ CITATION Res094 \n  \l 2057  }{ CITATION Res093 \n  \l 2057  }.10 More significantly, 
the World Bank has also concluded that if you are born in Mitrovica, then you are 35% likely 
to be born in extreme poverty than the rest of the country{ CITATION Wor07 \l 2057 }. 
 
Economic development for northern Kosovo is vital because it will help resolve many 
of the perilous conditions. Economic development will improve well being amongst the 
traumatised population, “lock in” ethnic co-operation through economic incentives and 
increase tax revenues so that critical health and environmental hazards can be addressed. Yet 
it is even more essential because of how it links to the political side of the problem. Studies 
have shown the most important systemic mechanism to maintain political agreements and a 
functioning state in post conflict areas is economic development. The most important study in 
this respect is Collier’s statistical analysis of a sample of 68 post conflict countries which 
concluded that economic growth- much more than democracy, troops or NGO projects- 
stabilises post conflict areas. Collier concludes that in order to maintain stability, post conflict 
efforts “should focus heavily upon economic recovery.” { CITATION Col06 \t  \l 2057  } 
 
My diagnosis has shown that at the root of the problem in Mitrovica is dysfunctional 
governance and severe economic underdevelopment. To evaluate the extent to which partition 
or integration can provide for a comprehensive solution one must therefore judge each 
scenario according to the following goals: 
 
Goal 1:  how likely is each option to end this contestation over what state should 
govern to enable a functioning state? This will be evaluated by scrutinising the particular 
characteristics of the option and assess whether they are commensurate with the wisdom from 
the academic literature and analyse whether the options have worked in similar situations in 
the past.  
 
Goal 2: how likely is that each option will put northern Kosovo on a path to economic 
development? To analyse this one has to work out which variables are important for economic 
development. Though this is hotly debated amongst academics, the conventional wisdom 
from the micro-economic literature suggests three basic variables are most likely to explain 
economic growth: the strength of institutions such as property rights; the scale of human, 
physical and natural capital; and the size of market access{ CITATION Red05 \l 2057 }. I 
assess how each scenarios affects these variables. 
                                                 
10A 55 year old Albanian resident commented: “Open my own business? No way! You cannot make money 
around here. You can only lose money. Maybe if things were more stable and solid I would think about it. 
Albanians have a business spirit, and we can be determined and organized, but building a successful business 
here is like trying to grow watermelons in the desert.”{ CITATION Res094 \n  \l 2057  } 
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What are the risks within each scenario? 
The expected returns need to be the weighed against the costs of each option. On the 
surface, these options do not really have many intrinsic costs. Partition for example would 
require just redrawing the map. To find the true costs one must broaden the analytical scope 
and take into account expected risks which in public policy can be defined “as uncertain 
future events with an (negative) impact on the objectives set by people and institutions.”{ 
CITATION Hab08 \p 1 \l 2057  }   
 
Risks therefore can be conceptualised as costs which are extrinsic to the policy 
formula but nevertheless are intimately related to the objectives set by the policy option. Each 
policy options changes dynamics in different ways and therefore each entails its own unique 
risks. In this analysis risks will mainly refer to negative “spill over effects” or changes to 
certain trends generated by the difference policy formulas. For example, one risk of 
integration is that it will intensify the already detectable trend of a Serb flight out of Mitrovica 
which is a cost extrinsic to the policy but produced by it. By then crafting the most efficient 
policies which can mitigate this risk, one can roughly work out the true costs of each option 
which will, in the final analysis, be weighed against expected returns. 
 
My risk analysis of the scenarios will therefore involve three phases{ CITATION Hab08 \l 
2057 }:  
 
Phase one: Risk identification is about identifying the most important risks and possible 
consequences which flow from it. It is based on analysing trends, facts in Mitrovica based 
upon my experience of field research and academic literature.11 
 
Phase two: Risk assessment evaluates the probability of the risk occurring. 
 
Phase three: Risk mitigation policy and cost involves crafting and costing the most efficient 
policies to mitigate the risk based on a thorough diagnosis of the cause of the risk and also on 
successful policies which have worked in similar situations. Costing them is based upon the 
best available data and therefore they do not profess to be exact. The costs of these policies 
will especially be of interest to the EU who are likely bear the brunt of the risk burden. 
Analytical framework 
                                                 
11
 In recent years, these strategic policy options to manage ethnic conflict have received much more scholarly 
attention. Most prominent in shaping the broader debate has been O’ Leary and McGarry who have presented a 
taxonomy of the “macro-political forms of ethnic conflict regulation” to either manage or terminate differences 
which have been pursued in prior efforts around the world. { CITATION McG94 \t  \l 2057  } This taxonomy is 
a classification of possibilities based on experience and it offers different macro regulations ranging from options 
to eliminate differences- genocide, forced mass population transfers, partition and assimilation- to ways to 
manage differences- hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation and consociationalism 
 Goal Analysis: Risk Analysis 
Option 1.Functioning 
state 
2.Economic 
development 
Risk Identification 
and assessment 
Risk Mitigation 
Policy and Cost 
1. Partition 
scenario 
Indicator: 
How likely is 
it scenario 
will end the 
Indicator: 
How likely is 
it scenario 
leads to 
Based on: Analysis 
of trends. 
 Based on: thorough 
diagnosis, reasoned 
rationale and 
policies from other 3.Integration 
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Policy Option 1:  Partition Kosovo along the River Ibar. 
Policy Description 
Partition can be defined as a fresh border cut through at least one community’s 
national homeland, creating at least two separate political units under different sovereigns or 
authorities { CITATION OLe07 \t  \l 2057  }. The partition scenario would therefore involve a 
new international border being drawn along the Ibar River so that the predominantly Serbian 
northern region becomes part of Serbia, with the predominately Albanian south Mitrovica 
remaining in Kosovo.  
 
 
 
 
 
Partition has been on the table ever since the end of the bombing in 1999. This is certainly an 
option that a Russian backed Serbia, who prefer to talk of “an internal adjustment of 
administrative boundaries leading to a new external border”, will put to the EU, possibly as 
scenario contestation 
over which 
state should 
govern?  
economic 
development 
(as measured 
by three 
variables)?  
areas. 
Partition Scenario: 
New International 
Border (red line) 
would partition 
northern Kosovo into 
Serbia. 
The partition border 
would cut through 
the town of 
Mitrovica splitting it 
into Serbian and 
Kosovan sections. 
SERBIA 
KOSOVO 
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part of their protracted EU accession negotiations. In contrast, Kosovo would reject a partition 
limited to its own territory { CITATION ICG10 \l 2057 }. Suspecting this, Belgrade has 
begun to float the idea, though not yet in public, of trading a large part of the Preševo Valley 
for the North of Kosovo, coupled with mutual recognition.  
 
The EU has indicated that the area of north Kosovo should not be partitioned into 
Serbia proper. For example, the conclusions of the 2005 European Council meeting affirmed, 
“there will be no partition of Kosovo, nor any union of Kosovo with another country or with 
part of another country.”{ CITATION Bru05 \l 2057 }. However, while publicly their stance 
seems clear there are signs that in private the EU may reconsider. On August 28, 2007, the 
Dutch foreign minister, Maxime Verhagen, for example became the first European foreign 
minister to state that partition of Kosovo into majority Albanian and Serb political territories 
would be an acceptable outcome.{ CITATION Bal \l 2057 } 
Goal Analysis: Expected returns 
 
Goal One: How likely is it that partition would end the contestation over which 
state should govern? 
 
On paper, this option envisions ending the contestation over statehood by allowing an 
official divorce between Serbs and Albanians to enable two states to function; a Serbian one 
operating north of the Ibar, and a Kosovan one south of it. Yet partition has failed to achieve a 
smooth divorce on numerous occasions and from this past experience we know that the 
partition of Kosovo must fulfil two basic criteria in order to be successful. 12  
 
Firstly, there must be a mutual desire for a divorce and it is highly likely that this 
criteria will be fulfilled{ CITATION Nic09 \l 2057 }. Nearly all the Serbs of northern Kosovo 
clearly want to become part of Serbia and have indicated as such in Mitrovica by displaying 
Serbian flags, statues of fallen Serbian heroes as well as continued use of the Serbian dinar.  
Albanians meanwhile express sadness at the possibility of the town being lost forever but 
there seems little desire for reconciliation { CITATION Res096 \n  \l 2057  }. Illustrative of 
this is the fact that nearly all Albanians in Mitrovica would currently disagree to have marital 
relations with Serbs { CITATION UND09 \l 2057 }.  
 
Secondly, scholarly learning also suggests that partition can only be fully effective if 
there is no large ethnic minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed partition { 
CITATION McG94 \l 2057 }. The population figures suggest this will not be the case as the 
area for proposed partition area is over 95% Serb { CITATION OSC07 \l 2057 } which 
indicates that partition has a high chance of achieving this goal.13 
                                                 
12
 The best-known theoretical argument for partition is elaborated in two influential articles by Chaim 
Kaufmann, who claims that partition is a good solution if it is impossible for groups to live together in an 
ethnically heterogeneous state{ CITATION Kau96 \t  \l 2057  }{ CITATION Kau98 \t  \l 2057  }. Kaufmann’s 
argument is based on the theoretical claims that ethnic power sharing is particularly unstable because ethnic 
identities, which harden during war and are thought to be more easily identifiable than other social identities, 
make individuals vulnerable to targeting for violence in the event of a failure of the peace process. Partition can 
help, according to Kaufmann, because it resolves the ethnic security dilemma: by dividing territory and 
physically separating warring groups, it reduces the threat that each ethnic group poses for the other. As a means 
of regulating conflict, partition has gained some recent currency and is currently being discussed in reference not 
just to northern Kosovo but to Bosnia, Iraq, Cyprus and many other places. 
13
 The remaining population is 3% Albanian and 2% Roma 3% .The Albanians do however represent a “risk” 
within this scenario. More later. 
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Goal two: How likely is it that partition would put Northern Kosovo on a path 
to economic development? 
 
To answer this, one has to assess how the establishment of a new international border 
can affect economic development. Important insights in this regard come from the new 
economic geography literature whose basic premise is that the size of market access 
determines spatial variations in economic activity { CITATION Kru91 \l 2057 }. Redding and 
Sturm have exploited the division of Germany during the Cold War as a natural experiment to 
provide evidence of the importance of market access for economic development. { 
CITATION Red05 \l 2057 } In their experiment they scrutinise economic developments of 
cities in West Germany close to the East West border in order to test the thesis that the 
institution of a border precipitated a substantial economic decline in these cities because they 
were cut off from markets in the East from which they had been integrated with for centuries. 
Controlling for other competing reasons such as differences in industrial structure or the 
degree of war related destruction, they find that the drop in market potential caused by the 
new border does explain the economic decline of cities such as Kassel and Kiel. Most 
importantly, they find this negative effect could be disproportionately higher for smaller 
cities, such as Mitrovica. 
 
Applying this insight to Mitrovica, then one can see partition comes with a high cost to 
economic development. Markets will not be entirely cut off, but costs of access will be higher 
due to tax revenues demanded by border custom regimes. These costs will be most strongly 
felt by the Serbs living in the north who will lose easy access to 2 million customers in 
Kosovo. For northern Serbs, the nearest market would be Novi Pazar which is a 90 minute 
journey away meaning that, for example, a specialist wedding dress maker will have to pay a 
draining €15 in petrol each time to enter into the market{ CITATION Res092 \n  \l 2057  }. 
These “costs of remoteness” will be felt for the town of Mitrovica as a whole, with businesses 
in the south also foregoing easy access to 40,000 customers north of the Ibar.  
 
While partition may provide for functioning states and so solid property rights, 
dividing an economic area into two will also reduce the human, natural and physical capital 
available to the citizens of this once economically integrated area. The most striking example 
of this would be the Trepca mining complex which, in this scenario, would see the mine being 
placed in Serbia, while the processing plant over the border in Kosovo.{ CITATION ICG99 \l 
2057 } Divided by an international border, the region will lose this vital piece of the economic 
jigsaw. 
Risk Analysis: 
In this section, the risks involved in a partition scenario will be identified and costed. 
 
Risk 1: Albanian insecurity north of the Ibar leads to demand for relocation 
Risk Identification:  The partition scenario would leave around 2,000 Kosovan Albanians 
who live north of the Ibar River permanently in Serbia. These five hundred or so families “on 
the wrong side of the track” live in three main areas: in the three tower blocks which straddle 
the northern bank of the river; in the so called mixed neighbourhood of Bosniak Mahalla and 
then in a more remote village to the west { CITATION ESI04 \l 2057 }. The risk is that these 
Albanians feel deeply insecure in a Serbian state and demand to be relocated.  
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Risk Assessment: The risk is high deducing from current trends. For example, Albanian 
residents of Bosniak Mahalla in the north already feel insecure and some live in constant fear 
of violence { CITATION Res098 \n  \l 2057  }.14 It should also be noted many of these 
families were subject to over a decade of “apartheid” while living in the Serbian state during 
the 90s and even the previous UNMIK administrator in the north has suggested that there is a 
real possibility of ethnic cleansing if Kosovo was partitioned { CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 }.  
 
Risk Mitigation Policy 
 
Rationale: One risk mitigation policy could be to ensure that Serbia adheres to its human 
rights obligations but this is unlikely to satisfy the Albanian population, who are likely to 
demand permanent protection. Relocation is ethically dubious given it seems to echo the 
Lausanne principle: the idea of negotiated exchanges of populations common in post conflict 
settlements in the Balkans throughout the 20th century, which have seemed to cause more 
suffering than good.{ CITATION Kum97 \l 2057 } However, relocation in this context is only 
small scale involving around 500 families, and the costs of relocation are less than the 
potential costs of an uprising or persecution. This option is therefore the best risk mitigation 
policy “out of all the worst possible options.” 
 
Policy: Implement a relocation plan in which 500 families are relocated into new specially 
built homes in Kosovo and are further compensated for loss of businesses and other losses.  
 
Cost: €60 m  
The cost to build a house in Kosovo is €60,000 including construction and land{ CITATION 
Res096 \n  \l 2057  }. Each will need to build a new house: 60,000 x 500= 30 million. It is 
likely that these families will need to be compensated and although it is difficult to say what 
the compensation costs should be we do know from the Israeli experience of relocation from 
Gaza that compensation was around double the cost of a house.15 
 
Risk 2: Partition opens a “Pandora’s Box” of regional instability. 
Risk Identification: The risk is that partition sends a signal to secessionist groups in the 
region that if enough pressure is exerted, the international community will give in to 
secessionist demands. Partition would also signal an end to multi-ethnicity as the normative 
basis for nation states in the Balkans, which could spur other secessionist groups to either call 
for their own states or to be joining other states. This domino effect could mean a “Pandora’s 
box” of Balkan instability will be opened with negative consequence for the political and 
economic development of the region. The possible unrest is likely to focus on three main 
areas: Presovo in southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Mitrovica itself.  
 
Risk Assessment: The probability of partition prompting a full blown conflagration is low. 
However, the possibility of disturbances and ruptures within political agreements is 
reasonably high, judging from how groups in the Balkans have reacted to similar signals in 
                                                 
14
 In interviews conducted in Bosniak Mahalla, Albanian residents said that generally relations were okay but 
that they lived in fear of a few rogue elements within the Serb community. One resident said that he blamed 
these rogue elements for the burning down of his shop.{ CITATION Res098 \n  \l 2057  } 
15
 It is estimated that the 1,500 Israeli settler families in Gaza would received $500,000 each to move into Israel. 
The average house price was US$211,036 at the time. Compensation logic amounted to therefore double the 
house price { CITATION Gid06 \l 2057  }. 
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the past. For example, Albanian nationalists in the Presovo valley see their future status as a 
corollary of what happens with Serbs in north Kosovo { CITATION ICG06 \l 2057 }. 
Consequently, they reacted to the NATO bombardment of Serbian forces in Kosovo by 
creating the self-proclaimed Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedya, and Bujanovac 
(UCPMB) to take up arms against the Serbian state. { CITATION CRS04 \l 2057 }. Though 
the situation in Presovo was provisionally resolved in 2001, some analysts suggest that a 
partition of Kosovo is likely to rejuvenate Albanian calls to become part of Kosovo as the 
area’s Albanian population. Likewise, the signal of the “victory” of the KLA in Kosovo 
encouraged Albanian factions to rise up in Macedonia in 2001. The risk now is that delicate 
2001 Ohrid Agreement between Macedonia’s Slav majority and its large Albanian minority 
might rupture in the face of the partition of Kosovo.{ CITATION ICG06 \l 2057 } Partition 
would also signal to Albanian nationalists a loss of Kosovo’s territorial integrity which could 
see continued unrest in Mitrovica. Albanian nationalists have accepted Serb domination of 
north Mitrovica, from which thousands of Albanians were expelled, only in the context of a 
unified, independent Kosovo.  “If partition is drawn along the River Ibar, Serbs will not be 
able to live in peace in north Mitrovica”, said a local Albanian politician in 2006, reflecting a 
widespread view that the Serb half of the city could be made unliveable by frequent rocket 
and mortar attacks. As a result, Mitrovica could revert to low-intensity warfare in which 
reintroduced Serbian security forces would regularly clash with Albanians across the river. { 
CITATION ICG06 \l 2057 }  
 
Risk Mitigation Policy 
 
Rationale: The international community would need to send a signal back to these groups 
that they are prepared to act to maintain stability. Such signalling has worked in the past. For 
example, the insurgency in Presovo was nullified by the presence of 300 NATO troop 
patrolling the border, while in Macedonia instability was quashed by the presence of a 1000 
NATO peacekeepers. 
 
Policy: At the very least in Mitrovica the 700 strong NATO presence and EULEX should be 
retained to secure against this risk. In Presovo and Macedonia, NATO troops may need to be 
dispatched but presumably they could come from the 10,000 strong force operating in 
Kosovo. 
 
Cost: €250m (KFOR 208m and EULEX 42m) 
The total cost of EULEX currently stands at €265m for the initial mandated 18 month period{ 
CITATION EC09 \l 2057 } which represent €170m per year. Based on interviews with 
EULEX officials, I know that the Mitrovica presence makes up around 25% of the total 
EULEX force from which one can approximate that maintaining EULEX in Mitrovica costs 
around €42million per year. There are currently 700 KFOR troops in Mitrovica.{ CITATION 
NAT10 \l 2057 } But it is very difficult to cost them as the information is not publicly 
available. But one knows that $936 m was given to a 2,500 US force in 2004{ CITATION 
CRS04 \l 2057 } which per troop amounts €297,165 based on 2004 exchange rates. The best 
estimate is therefore that maintaining KFOR in Mitrovica costs around €208 m per year.  
 
Risk 3: Permanent loss of welfare services causes Albanian flight out of south 
Mitrovica.  
Risk Identification: Drawing a border through Mitrovica would mean that the services once 
offered by Mitrovica as a whole will be denied to both communities. This permanent loss of 
welfare provision will affect the citizens of the south especially hard because they will lose 
access to vital educational and health facilities as most of the schools, the university and the 
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hospital would be located over the border in the north. The risk therefore is that, without this 
provision, families of south Mitrovica would fear for their future, which could lead to a flight 
out of Mitrovica which will put enormous pressure on other Kosovan cities.  
 
Risk Assessment: Judging from current trends, the risk of a “ghost town” in south Mitrovica 
emerging is high. Due to the problems of going to the north of the city, many Albanians are 
already feeling the strain of this loss of welfare services. For example, with difficult access to 
the hospital 30 metres over the river in the north part of the town, the 80,000 citizens living in 
the south must travel 35km to Pristina. This is especially problematic when it is an emergency 
situation as only one ambulance is responsible for transporting patients from Mitrovica to 
Pristina{ CITATION IKS09 \l 2057 }.16  In terms of educational provision, currently, 20,000 
Albanian school children are crammed into the roughly the same number of schools as 4,000 
Serbs { CITATION ICG05 \l 2057 }. There is a vast shortage of classrooms, equipment and 
textbooks and the length of classes has shortened due to this deficiency. { CITATION IKS09 
\l 2057 } Families are already worried about this loss of welfare provision and many are 
responding by leaving Mitrovica altogether to live with family members in other cities, such 
as Pristina and Prizren, which foreshadows a stronger flight out within a partition scenario{ 
CITATION Res098 \n  \l 2057  }.17  
 
 
Risk Mitigation Policy 
 
Rationale: The policy should address these deficiencies by offering a “welfare perspective” 
for the predominantly Albanian citizens living in the south.  
 
Policy: Build a new hospital, university and three new schools to offer the citizens of the 
south a “welfare perspective” based upon normal Kosovan standards.  
 
Cost: 12m 
A new university will cost 5m based upon the expected costs of a 2000 capacity university 
built in the similar sized city of Prizren. { CITATION New09 \l 2057  }. A new hospital will 
also cost 5m based upon the amount the Norwegian Development Agency has committed to 
building a 212 bed hospital just outside Pristina.{ CITATION IKS09 \l 2057 } Three new 
schools will be required and these will cost 2m in total based upon a USAID donation for one 
school in Kranidell. { CITATION USA09 \l 2057 } 
Policy Analysis Option 2: Results 
 
                                                 
16
 If the ambulance is occupied or en route to Pristina, other patients must organize their own transport. Hospital 
staff members are not surprised anymore when patients die on the way to Pristina { CITATION Res096 \n  \l 
2057  } 
17
 The flight out is a recurring theme in interviews. “Every day the squares are emptying because no one believes 
that they can have a happy future” says the Director of the Employment Agency.{ CITATION Res096 \n  \l 2057  
} 
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Policy Option 2: Integrate northern region into Kosovo 
based upon the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan 
Policy Description 
This option involves generating a scenario in which all political and administrative links the 
north of the Ibar Serbs have with Belgrade, especially the parallel structures, are dissolved 
and the Serbian population is re-orientated towards Pristina. To do this, integration would 
involve establishing a distribution of power envisioned in the Ahtisaari plan which involves 
two elements. First it affords substantial political autonomy to the Serbs north of the Ibar and 
secondly it involves some degree of local power sharing as the north and south Mitrovica 
municipalities will resolve city wide issues through an international mediated “Joint Board.” { 
CITATION Aht07 \l 2057 }18 
Goal Analysis: Expected returns 
 
Goal One: How likely is it that integration would end the contestation over 
which state should govern? 
 
The aim of power sharing/ autonomy arrangements, such as the Ahtisaari plan, is to 
ensure that separatist minorities remain in a common state based on the idea of ethnic 
pluralism as well as making the minorities less apprehensive about their future in a majority, 
dominated state. { CITATION Jen09 \l 2057 }. In order to work, scholarly learning suggests 
settlements must aim to secure enough “rights, identities, freedoms and opportunities of all 
ethnic communities, and to create political and social institutions which enable them to enjoy 
the benefits of equality without forced assimilation.”{ CITATION McG94 \p 36 \l 2057  }  
 
From this insight, one should test whether the Ahtisaari integration formula would 
achieve an end to the contestation over which state governs and therefore establish a 
functioning state, by evaluating whether the formula affords the northern Serbs enough 
secured rights and political power so that they can agree that their political future lies linked 
to Serbia but ultimately within a Kosovan constitutional order. 
 
Scrutinising the Ahtisaari formula closely, it is clear that on paper at least, this option 
has a high chance of securing an agreement. Indeed, analysts have concluded that this formula 
provides minority rights for Kosovo Serbs which go far beyond European standards { 
CITATION ICG06 \l 2057 }.They include the creation of more and expanded Serb-majority 
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 This is the preferred option of the EU and, much more grudgingly, the Kosovan establishment 
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Welfare perspective: 12m 
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municipalities, including a new north Mitrovica municipality, with extended competencies 
and the right to link with one another and benefit from Serbian government assistance; special 
protection zones and prerogatives for the Serbian Orthodox Church; and additional 
parliamentary seats and double-majority rules to prevent Serbs from being outvoted on vital 
interest questions. The provision of even more rights could undermine the functionality and 
survival of a future state, and create a highly unusual environment in which the small minority 
of Serbs would have significantly greater rights than the majority{ CITATION ICG06 \l 2057 
}.  
 
Another reason why one can conclude that this option has a high chance of success is that 
very similar ethnic reintegration formulas have worked to good effect in comparable areas in 
the Balkans, notably in Brcko in Bosnia. Brcko represents a striking example because this 
integration formula aimed at resolving a situation very similar to Mitrovica. Both Brcko and 
Mitrovica suffered from bitter ethnic divisions in the 1990s; both have a similar population, 
with similar ethnic proportions; and both suffered from post war economic decline and the 
absence of a functioning state { CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 }. Integration has been 
particularly successful in Brcko where, once considered a “black hole of chauvinism, 
intransigence, criminality and despair,” there is now even a multi ethnic police force, a clear 
sense of security and relative economic prosperity { CITATION ICG04 \l 2057 }. 
 
Goal two: How likely is it that integration would put Northern Kosovo on a 
path to economic development? 
 
An assessment of the most relevant variables suggests that this option is most likely to 
put Mitrovica on the path to economic development.  Firstly, with a high likelihood of a 
functioning state emerging, we can assume property rights and micro economic governance 
will improve. Secondly, market access will be enhanced as integration will “reopen” the 
markets now closed by the ethnic division. In addition, it is possible that an integrated, multi 
ethnic Mitrovica will have a competitive advantage as a market interlocutor between Serbs 
and Albanians of the wider Balkan region. { CITATION Off09 \n  \l 2057  }.  
 
Most importantly, this option would mean that all the advantages coming from 
northern Kosovo’s natural, physical and human capital can be realised. An example of this is 
represented by the possibility of developing the fine countryside north of the Ibar into a 
tourism site for the region.{ CITATION Res093 \n  \l 2057  } One of the major reasons 
preventing growth of tourism in this area is that Serbs, in contrast to Albanians, do not speak 
the requisite languages to entice more tourists. Hence, the absence of integration means that 
there is not an efficient allocation of human capital in northern Kosovo. In an integration 
scenario however, Serbian entrepreneurs could address this deficiency by employing 
Albanians, who by virtue of a diaspora as well as a decade of interaction with an army of 
international officials are very capable multi linguists{ CITATION Mit09 \n  \l 2057  }. 
Risk Analysis 
 
Risk 1: A Serbian flight out of north Mitrovica. 
Risk Identification: While a partition scenario may prompt an Albanian exodus, integration 
could intensify an eqaully negative trend already detectable north of the Ibar which is the 
flight out of Serbs. This Serbian “exodus” would not only be damaging to social and political 
life, but the drain of citizens will also have negative economic consequences due to the human 
and financial capital they depart with. 
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Risk Assessment: The likelihood of some form of exodus in this scenario is high. Many 
Serbs are already pre-empting integration into Kosovo by buying apartments in Serbia to 
avoid the “tragedy” of becoming “Kosovan” citizens{ CITATION KSe09 \n  \l 2057  }.19 
There are also warning signs from other areas where integration led to a sizeable Serb flight. 
For example, 75,000 Serbs fled from Eastern Slavonia between 1995-1999 even though 
integration was undertaken with considerable international supervision{ CITATION CTN06 \l 
2057 }. 
 
Risk Mitigation policy 
 
Rationale: How to avoid a Serbian exodus? Given that this risk is high, any risk mitigation 
policy should be extensive and as a starting point one should first question is to ask what 
motivates the average Kosovan Serb to depart from northern Kosovo? As discussed, within 
the integration formula on offer Serbs will be afforded rights higher than European standards 
and so an exodus cannot be explained by “grievance.” Following on from their famous 
“Greed and Grievance” concept to explain motivations behind civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler 
have investigated specifically what motivates secessionist behaviour by testing the thesis that 
“the robust and ancient cause of economic self interest” determines whether a group wants to 
join another state{ CITATION Col062 \p 40 \t  \l 2057  } The authors’ multiple regression 
analysis finds a strong correlation between economic advantage and the desire to join other or 
form new states. This finding is not only convincing from a theoretical perspective, as 
evidence from the Serbia enclaves suggests that the less money being paid by Belgrade to 
Serb public workers, the more likely they are to co-operate with the Kosovan state{ 
CITATION ICG091 \l 2057 }.20  
 
Hence, economic self interest matters and though my analysis suggests that integration is 
likely to yield economic development in the long term; in the short term visible and proactive 
measures are vital. Any risk mitigation policy must focus on providing a robust economic 
perspective based on creating jobs and opportunities for northern Serbs who may feel that 
their economic well being, especially public sector pay, is threatened by integration into 
Kosovo{ CITATION Res093 \n  \l 2057  }.21 An economic perspective would be too 
expensive to construct a new but rather must be based on the natural economic advantages of 
northern Kosovo. Two policies are critical to establishing an economic perspective: 
 
Policy one: Reactivate Trepca mining complex within a public/ private partnership 
Mitrovica was historically a one-industry mining town dominated by the huge Trepca 
mine complex that employed both Serbs and Albanians but which now lies dormant due to 
war damage.22 An economic perspective should involve reactivating Mitrovica’s largest 
natural asset, especially since manufacturing in the town has all but disappeared.23 Trepca will 
never recover its former glory but it is reasonable to assume that if reactivated it could 
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 A 35 year old Serb man said: “We are not stupid here in Mitrovica. We know there soon will be a tragedy and 
I personally have already bought a place in Novi Pazar {Serbia} for my family.” A 21 year old Serbian woman 
told me: “Serbs here will never be ruled by Albanians. Look around this is Serbia, not Kosovo. No one will stay 
if they try to put the Kosovan flag here.”{ CITATION KSe09 \n  \l 2057  } 
20
 For example, the ICG cites the example a Serb hospital specialist in the enclave of Strpce who refused to sign 
a contract with the Kosovo authorities in July 2008 but agreed when offered the opportunity again in January 
2009 because Serbia had reduced his pay by 50% due to Belgrade’s spiralling budget deficit. 
21
 Public sector workers will be paid about twice as less from Pristina as they would get from Belgrade. 
22
 In 1988, the Trepça employed 22,885 workers, representing nine percent of Kosovo’s labour force sector.{ 
CITATION ESI04 \l 2057 } 
23
 In south Mitrovica, only one percent of the population works in manufacturing. { CITATION ESI04 \l 2057 } 
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provide around 7-10,000 jobs24{ CITATION ICG99 \l 2057 }. Trepca’s economic revival is 
obstructed by many things, such as legal wrangling over ownership, damaged infrastructure, 
and the high costs of re activation { CITATION IKS09 \l 2057 }. The EU should try to court 
major mining companies to engage in some sort of public private partnership whereby the EU 
guarantees the costs of clear up and reconstruction of the site, in exchange for significant 
private investment into operations. 
 
Cost: €100m 
The cost of cleaning the site so that it can match European standards is estimated to be €100m 
{ CITATION UNM04 \l 2057 }.  
 
Policy two: Transform Mitrovica into a regional “centre of excellence” for service 
provision.  
This policy is aimed at creating an economic perspective for white collar workers, especially 
professors, teachers and doctors, who are most likely to constitute the exodus. Such a policy 
should focus on expanding, transforming and modernising two major institutions already 
placed in Mitrovica: the hospital and university. Establishing Mitrovica as a regional “centre 
of excellence” for health and educational services would guarantee these workers attractive 
employment opportunities and allow them to practise their profession to the highest level. 
Another advantage is that this will also create economic multiplier effects: universities and 
hospitals employ many workers, spend a substantial amount of money and can have much 
wider effects through the outputs they produce such as knowledge, skills and healthy workers. 
 
Cost: €50m: Renovation of university (40m) and hospital (10m).  
Currently the university in north Mitrovica is in a state of disrepair { CITATION Res093 \n  \l 
2057  } and the renovation of the university should be based upon the standards set by the best 
higher educational facilities in the region. The South East European University established in 
2001 in Tetovo, Macedonia, just as Tetovo was on the brink of civil war, offers a good 
example. This university is considered to be one of the best in the region and it has brought 
together students from both Macedonian and Albanian communities, helping to stabilise the 
town and provide much-needed jobs and capital. The university took a year to build at a cost 
of 40 million but the institution is now self financing. { CITATION Eur \l 2057 }. 
 
The 700 bed hospital in the north is also somewhat in a state of disrepair and will need some 
renovation and overhaul to have a competitive advantage over other hospitals in the region { 
CITATION Mit09 \n  \l 2057  }. The model of excellence it should follow is represented by 
the new TMC hospital built in Sofia which is the most technologically advanced in the region. 
Local economic experts working on the ground would put the cost at renovation to around 
€10m { CITATION Off09 \n  \l 2057  }. 
 
Risk 2: The creation of “spoilers” who incite medium level violence. 
Risk Identification: A particular risk in the integration scenario is that “spoilers” are 
generated. Spoilers aim to “spoil” political agreements and emerge when “leaders and parties 
who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and 
interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”{ CITATION Ste07 \p 1 \l 
2057  }  There is clear evidence of potential “spoilers” in Mitrovica who can be described as 
powerful “intertwined political-clan-criminal networks” { CITATION Pon08 \l 2057 } In 
particular, some Serbs complain of the nefarious influence of a "Kolasin group" from a village 
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 In Mostar, the re-start of the aluminium manufacturing plant, which now enjoys a major contract with 
automobile manufacturer Daimler-Benz, significantly boosted the local economy { CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 } 
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deep in northern Kosovo { CITATION ICG05 \l 2057 }. The risk is that this group of potential 
spoilers place themselves outside of the integration process in order to disrupt or destroy it. 
The most likely method they will use is to incite medium level violence in Northern Kosovo, 
ranging from the intimidation of “collaborators” to the use of force against EULEX and 
KFOR. 
 
Risk Assessment: An integration scenario would bring about a functioning, multi ethnic state, 
which would represent a threat to spoilers’ interests because they will lose the political power 
and the benefits flowing to them from limited statehood. For example, many of these potential 
spoilers currently reap benefits from VAT, customs and excise collection due to Pristina's 
lacks of effective control over the administrative boundary line with Serbia. Moreover a 
functioning state threatens their power base as it makes it more difficult for them to sustain 
their essentially illegal patronage networks and makes it more difficult to use the intimidation 
and violence to get their own way.25 These potential spoilers have also shown a marked 
tendency to react with violence to unfavourable political developments in the past. For 
example, they reacted to Kosovo’s declaration of independence by burning down the custom 
and border posts with Serbia proper as well as raiding the UNMIK supervised court, which 
led to a three day gun battle with NATO troops { CITATION ICG09 \l 2057 }. 
 
Risk Mitigation Policy 
 
Rationale: In his review of peacemaking in the 90s, Stedman argues the crucial difference 
between success and failure of spoilers is the role played by international actors as custodians 
of peace. What precaution can one take against these spoilers? The basic rationale should be 
that in order eradicate them, it is critical to deny them the resources upon which they thrive: 
political control and lawlessness. 
 
Policy one: Institute an interim “European Administration Mitrovica.” 
 
Other experiences of post war integration in the Balkans suggest that it is very important to 
sideline “spoilers” through strong external arbitration. In Mitrovica, this would require the EU 
to neutralise disruptive agents by denying them political power through a short term 
administration, which while not being in power could shape certain political outcomes. For 
example in Mostar, the initial international engagement was not assertive enough to ensure 
that legitimate authority took root and illegitimate agents were disenfranchised mainly due to 
poor financial backing and disorganisation. In response, strong EU representation was set up 
for over two years in order to promote moderate elements, and through some degree control 
of resources, was able to strengthen the power sharing elements of the new local political 
system { CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 }.26 
 
Cost: € 6m 
This is based on the costs of the 60- strong EUAM in Mostar. 
 
Policy two: Maintain EULEX presence and NATO presence.  
                                                 
25Two potential spoilers, Mario Jaksic and Milan Ivanovic, are currently senior managers at the hospital.  
Medical staffs are reportedly expected to show political loyalty by attending anti Albanian demonstrations and 
nursing and non-medical staff are on short term contracts in order to discourage dissent { CITATION ICG05 \l 
2057 }. 
26
 Two EU offices, the European Union Administration Mostar (EUAM) and, for the final six months, the 
European Union Special Envoy Mostar (ESEM), administered Mostar from July 23, 1994, to December 31, 1996 
{ CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 }. 
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A vital lesson learned from the successful sideling of spoilers in Eastern Slavonia is that a 
security presence is needed to swiftly embed the rule of law as well as to contain any possible 
violence perpetrated by spoilers. In Eastern Slavonia, the 5,000 troops of UNTAES were able 
to exert a high degree of control and coordination over the region while the integrationist 
political formula was rooted and a smaller KFOR force would be needed to do the same in 
Mitrovica { CITATION CTN06 \l 2057 }. In addition, EULEX will be vital to train local 
police forces, as well as in the interim to ensure that the rule of law is entrenched, which will 
shrink the spoilers’ room for manoeuvre.  
 
Cost: €250m 
 
Risk 3: A lack of social interaction produces polarised ethnic politics. 
Risk 3: A system of politics based on ethnic compromise is vital to this integration scenario. 
A risk is that an absence of general social interaction leads to a negative political dynamic 
common in post conflict areas in which ethnic politicians try to “outbid” each other as 
defenders of an ethnic group’s interest (Nordlinger, 1972). Politicians therefore compete over 
who is the strongest champion of the group’s national interests, rather than campaign on a 
platform of ethnic moderation, which could threaten the workings of the integrationist 
formula, envisioned in the Ahtisaari plan. 
 
Risk Assessment: This dynamic of “ethnic outbidding” thrives in contexts in which there is 
no interaction between the ethnic groups because the ensuing social void perpetuates negative 
stereotypes which “uncompromising” politicians spin to their own electoral advantage { 
CITATION Nor72 \l 2057 }. Trends in social interaction between Albanians and Serbs 
suggest that the probability of this risk occurring is high. For example, 80% of Albanians and 
70% of Serbs in Mitrovica would not live in the same street or town as the other ethnic race 
and virtually no families interact socially{ CITATION Res093 \n  \l 2057  }.27 As a result, 
stereotypes reign: Albanians sometimes believe that the Serbs across the river are fascist 
criminals, while Serbs are encouraged to believe Kosovo proper is an Albanian badland 
governed by “terrorists” { CITATION Res098 \n  \l 2057  } 
 
Risk Mitigation policy 
 
Rationale: Any risk mitigation policy should be extensive and focus on encouraging 
interaction between Albanians and Serbs in order to facilitate the creation of a “Mitrovica” 
identity to undermine potential ethnic polarisation. Critical here is the concept of “social 
capital” which refers to “instances in which people cooperate for common ends on the basis of 
shared informal norms and values.”{ CITATION Fuk02 \p 24 \l 2057  }  Given the ethnic 
divide in Mitrovica it is necessary to create “bridging social capital” which spans different 
identities, histories and viewpoints. One scholar notes that the experience of post conflict 
zones has shown that the creation of bridging social capital is necessary for a functioning 
democratic state because it helps to dismantle exaggerated, exclusionary ethnic identities{ 
CITATION Mer06 \l 2057 }. At the moment, there are few common institutions- marriage, 
learning, language or cultural- which could help cultivate social capital in Mitrovica and so 
they must be created. 
 
                                                 
27
 A 28 year old Albanian explained: “Before the war, my family was good friends with our neighbours who 
were Serbs. We used to go on picnics together but now we never see them. I have no idea what is going on in 
their lives.”{ CITATION Res096 \n  \l 2057  } 
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Policy: Creating bridging social capital involves developing mutual interpersonal trust which 
is created and maintained by interactions with others, especially within formal organizations 
and informal groups { CITATION Nel04 \l 2057 }. Small scale activities can help create 
mutual interpersonal trust like joint cultural activities, or by putting a moratorium on teaching 
local history which was done successfully in Eastern Slavonia. From a more long term 
perspective, the policy I recommend is to reaffirm the importance of building a multi-lingual, 
multi ethnic university based on the Tetovo model because a common learning space on this 
scale provides an effective arena in which mutual interpersonal trust can develop. The 
experience of Tetovo is instructive as when the university was set up in 2001, Macedonian 
and Albanians were on the brink of civil war. Yet, the university has fostered far greater 
social interaction between the two groups with the result that tensions are now reduced and 
Tetovo is now considered an appealing university town { CITATION Eur \l 2057 }. 
 
Cost: N/A as this policy also pursued as part of policy to address risk one. 
Policy Analysis Option 3: Results 
 
 
 
 
  
Option Goal Analysis Risk Analysis 
 
Integr
ation 
Functioning 
state 
Economic 
development 
Risk identification and 
assessment 
Risk Mitigation Policy and 
Cost (€) 
HIGH HIGH 1 Serbian flight out of 
north Mitrovica 
 
2. “Spoilers” attempt to 
destroy agreement 
 
3. Political polarisation. 
 
Total: 406 m 
 
Trepca reactivation:100m 
Hospital renovation:10m 
University renovation:40m 
EU Administration: 6m 
EULEX:  42m 
KFOR:    208m 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
A thorough thinking through of the two conceivable options for a comprehensive solution to 
the problem in Mitrovica produces the following results. 
Summary of Analysis: 
*in the final analysis, I have put the costs of security (EULEX and KFOR) in parenthesis. 
This because they are the same in each scenario, they are based on very rough estimates and 
the financing for EULEX and KFOR over the next few years is most likely to have been 
accounted for  already and so they do not represent “additional costs.” 28 
Recommendations: 
Three recommendations flow from this analysis: 
 
Recommendation 1:  Pristina, Belgrade and the EU should seek an immediate 
comprehensive solution to the situation in Northern Kosovo and in doing so should 
reject outright any proposal to partition northern Kosovo. 
The urgent choice is therefore between partition and integration. Based on my analysis, the 
partition option would incur about €84m less in costs than integration, which could prove an 
attractive saving in today’s budgetary climate.  
 
Yet, if we scrutinise the policy more closely, it is clear partition is inferior and should be 
rejected. Firstly, my analysis shows partition is likely to prompt an economic decline in 
                                                 
28
 EULEX’s mandate is highly likely to be renewed in the summer of 2010 and NATO has confirmed that 
although they are to reduce troop numbers to 10,000, they are certain to stay in Kosovo for the next few years. 
Option Goal Analysis Risk Analysis 
 
 
Functioning 
state 
Economic 
development 
Risk 
identification and 
assessment 
Risk Mitigation Policy and 
Cost (€) 
Partition HIGH LOW 1.Albanian relocation 
 
2. Regional 
instability 
 
3. Albanian flight out 
Total: 72 m (322m) 
 
Relocation of Albanians: 60m 
Welfare perspective in south: 12m 
 
(EULEX: 42m  
KFOR:  208m)  
 
Integrati
on 
HIGH HIGH 1 Serbian flight out of 
north Mitrovica 
 
2. “Spoilers” attempt 
to destroy agreement 
 
3. Political 
polarization 
 
Total: 156 m (406m) 
 
Trepca reactivation: 100m 
Hospital renovation: 10m 
University renovation: 40m 
EU Administration: 6m 
 
(EULEX:  42m  
KFOR:    208m)  
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Mitrovica, which means it will fail to achieve a precondition of a comprehensive solution. 
Moreover, as discussed, this could directly threaten the stability of the partition agreement. 
Secondly, the nature of the risks seems far more serious than with integration, especially 
because it may involve ethnic cleansing as well possible instability in other areas. In other 
words, even though the financial costs may be lower, more importantly the human costs of 
partition will be a lot higher. Finally, the policies needed to mitigate the risks produced by 
partition are essentially “fire fighting” policies; that is they contain problems, for example by 
relocating citizens, and will not directly yield any gains in the future. These evidence based 
arguments should be used in negotiations to counter possible Serbian claims that partition 
represents a “fair solution.” 
 
In contrast, though the costs of integration are higher, the necessary risk mitigation policies 
are fundamentally more productive: the policies create an economic perspective, they produce 
stability and they build social capital. Crucially, this policy is also highly likely to achieve the 
goals necessary to resolve the Mitrovica problem and so spending an extra €84m is certainly a 
good investment.  
 
Recommendation 2: The EU should pursue integration of the northern region into 
Kosovo based upon the Ahtisaari formula and in order to fully mitigate risks, it should 
implement these four policies: 
 
1. Reactivate Trepca mining complex within a public/ private partnership. 
2. Transform Mitrovica into a regional “centre of excellence” for service provision 
I. Renovate hospital 
II. Overhaul university 
3. Institute an interim “European Administration Mitrovica.” 
4. Maintain a EULEX and KFOR security presence.  
 
Recommendation 3: The EU should use all available diplomatic means within Serbia’s 
EU accession negotiations to gain Serbia’s support for the integration of Northern 
Kosovo.  
If we discount the security costs (EULEX and NATO at €250m per annum) which we can 
assume are already budgeted for, the risk mitigation policies involved in integration require 
€156m to be found. To put this in perspective, this is just short of the €187.4m which the EU 
instrument for pre-accession assistance (IPA) allocated for the entire Kosovo { CITATION 
Zau09 \l 2057 }. With the EU’s current financial predicament as well as internal divisions 
over Kosovo, it remains to be seen whether the EU will be willing to raise this money.  
In order to save costs, the EU should engage with the most important stakeholder: Serbia. The 
€156m was factored on the well grounded assumption that Serbia would continue to resist 
Kosovo’s independence.29 If Serbia were to accept the integration of the northern region, this 
would certainly reduce risks and therefore costs. For example, without backing from 
Belgrade, fewer Kosovan Serbs would leave Kosovo; “spoilers” would be weakened; and 
hardline politicians would have a less reliable political “big brother.” The best channel to get 
Serbia to support this policy is through EU accession negotiations as it is clear that the 
overwhelming goals of President Tadic’s administration in Serbia is join the EU { CITATION 
Jud10 \t  \l 2057  }. Whether, Serbia will ever be willing to lend support to the EU’s goal in 
Kosovo is unknown, but considering the benefits, the EU should use all its diplomatic muscle 
to try to win support. 
                                                 
29
 For example, in January 2010 debates in the UN Security Council, Serbia made it clear that they still deem 
Kosovo’s independence as illegal { CITATION Bal \l 2057 }.  
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